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“100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces”: The
Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai1
Austin Clark
In the year 1545, during the latter half of
Japan‘s Sengoku Period or ―Age of Warring
States‖, the minor samurai Ukida Naoie was
assigned thirty men and a small fief in the province
of Bizen. His task was to cultivate and defend this
small corner of the province from the ambitious and
power-hungry lords and bandits that abounded in
the Sengoku Period, but Naoie set his sights higher.
Given direct control over his thirty men, a mere
garrison force of infantry, he used them to conquer
and rule over neighboring fiefs in the province. His
reputation and his army grew with each victory and
before long, Naoie controlled more than a tenth of
1

―The Seventeen-Article Injunction of Asakura
Toshikage, c. 1480,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 176.
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Bizen and over half of his original thirty men had
castles and fiefs to call their own. Naoie himself
ruled out of Okayama castle, which he had built for
himself, and kept a tight rein on his subordinates
through taxation and rotation of service. In 1577
Naoie, after taking over most of the neighboring
Matsuda lord‘s forts and province, stormed his own
lord‘s keep under flimsy pretenses and seized
control of the now expanded Bizen.2
Ukida Naoie‘s bloody and meteoritic rise to
power in the space of just thirty years was similar to
that of several, eventually more well known
daimyo, or Japanese feudal lords. Oda Nobunaga
especially would write a similar story, albeit on a
larger scale, expanding from his inherited Owari

2

John Whitney Hall, ―Foundations of the Modern
Japanese Daimyo,‖ The Journal of Asian Studies 20, No. 2
(May 1961): 323-325.
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province in south-central Japan to unite most of the
main Japanese island of Honshū.3 This move would
propel him into history as the first of Japan‘s great
unifiers, three individuals who would overcome
long odds to consolidate their power and pull Japan
out of the tumultuous Sengoku Period. The other
two, following almost immediately on the heels of
Nobunaga, were Toyotomi Hideyoshi and
Tokugawa Ieyasu, who would complete the
centralization of power and control set in motion by
their predecessor. Yet the enormous power and
influence this trio of unifiers wielded did not
materialize overnight and its genesis is somewhat
obscure, even if the legacy it left is not.
The turmoil of the Sengoku Period gave
birth to the centralized power Ukida Naoie would
3

Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History,
(Surrey, England: Japan Library, 1996), 132-135.
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tinker with and all three of the unifiers would come
to enjoy. As a period of constant and chaotic
warfare, Sengoku stormed the walls of wellestablished tradition and forged quite literally in the
heat of battle a new dominant military force that
would shape the social order of the next 350 years
and give brilliant men like Nobunaga and Hideyoshi
the means to come to power. The localized nature of
the Sengoku Period fighting and the increasing role
of technology established the infantryman as the
decisive force on the battlefield, toppling the
mounted samurai out of dominance and giving the
ambitious daimyo who controlled them
unprecedented power. The leaders who recognized
this social shift and founded their influence in a
large corps of disciplined, professional infantry

10

would emerge victorious and found their shogunal
power in these ideas.
The dominance of infantry on the battlefield
by the end of the Sengoku Period was absolute. A
look at the muster rolls for the daimyo Gotō
Sumiharu in 1592, part of Hideyoshi‘s ill-fated
invasion of Korea, reveals that 90% of his force was
made up of infantry; out of 220 men only 27 were
samurai on horses.4 Takeda Shingen, a daimyo who
became known for his use of an exceptional amount
of cavalry, as well as his skill in using them, had a
ratio of approximately two infantrymen to every
horseman in his army. By 1590, when Hideyoshi
was firmly in control and just finishing his
unification of Japan, he ordered troops from the
Daté household and asked that they be supplied
4

Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan’s
Korean War 1592-1598, (London: Cassell & Co, 2002), 44.
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with only thirty horses.5 At the battle of Sekigahara
in 1600, the battle in which Tokugawa Ieyasu
would take control of Japan from Hideyoshi‘s heir
and lead it into centuries of peace, about 85,000
men were involved on each side.6 Added together
170,000 men fought on the small plain at
Sekigahara, many times more than could be
mustered simply from the elite seven to eight
percent of a warrior society.
The meaning of the term ―Sengoku Period‖
itself speaks eloquently to the situation in which the
infantry suddenly found themselves prominent:
The aggregation of private
wars…became combined into a
simple struggle for survival with
5

Delmer M. Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on
Japanese Warfare, 1543-98,‖ The Far Eastern Quarterly 7,
No. 3 (May, 1948): 244.
6
Michael Haskew, Christer Jorgensen, Chris McNab,
Eric Niderost and Rob S. Rice, Fighting Techniques of the
Oriental World AD 1200-1860: Equipment, Combat Skills and
Tactics (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2008), 164.
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rapidly changing alliances, triumphs
and disasters, that was to last for
over a century. Borrowing an
expression from the Chinese, the
years for 1490 to 1600 are called the
‗Sengoku-Jidai,‘ which is best
translated as ‗the Age of the Country
at War.‘ It was war on a scale vaster
and more terrible than Japan had yet
experienced.7
The ―war on a scale vaster and more
terrible‖ was, by and large, due to infantry
involvement. The reason is twofold. In 1568, while
the Sengoku infighting raged in many ways its
hottest, Japan had a population of a staggering 10
million people, spread over three main islands.8
These islands were, in turn, covered by mountains,
with geographically youthful bedrock peaks
covering 80% of Japan‘s surface. The remaining
portion was made up primarily of uniformly flat
7

Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 116.
Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, (Berkley,
California: University of California Press, 1993), 11.
8
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lowlands, the three largest of which came to house
the majority of Japan‘s population.9 The
geographical closeness of the islands translated into
localized and dense fighting. The plain of
Kawanakajima, one of the few open plains nestled
between several mountain ranges and rivers,
witnessed no less than five battles between 1553
and 1564, strong testimony to how Japan‘s
geography influenced its wars.10
Historically, however, this influence had not
always held true. In past wars, Japanese armies
relied on the elite, mounted samurai horse archers
who would respond quickly to a threat across any

9

Ibid., 5.
Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 269.
10
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portion of the islands.11 The system had evolved out
of eight and ninth century conflicts with the Emishi,
the ―barbarians‖ who inhabited northern Japan,
when their light, mobile and hard hitting cavalry
wrecked one Japanese expedition after another.12
The tradition was further refined after the Mongol
invasions of the 1200‘s showed the need for less
cumbersome armor and the utility of the closecombat oriented spear or naginata.13 With the
coming of the Sengoku Period, the close, violent
fighting that resulted would dramatically change the
way the Japanese looked at war.
This closeness, when combined with Japan‘s
comparatively immense population, turned infantry
11

Arnold Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖
Military History 28 (December 2004).
12
Paul Varley, Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the
War Tales (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 3-5.
13
Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 91.
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into a natural and easily available fighting force.
Daimyo, the feudal Japanese lords whose constant
and varied bids for power perpetuated the civil war,
were ever vigilant for ways to gain the upper hand.
Japan‘s geography and large population made it
easy to recruit, concentrate, and fight with masses
of foot soldiers. Initially these ashigaru, literally
meaning ―light feet‖ because of their tendency to
loot the battlefields and towns in the manner of
more modern ―footpads,‖ were almost mercenary in
nature, fighting for the spoils they could steal and
having little loyalty, often drifting off to tend crops
or even to switch sides if the opportunities for
bounty looked more promising. To compound
issues, they were almost to a man poorly trained and
ill-disciplined, making their only real value the

16

numbers in which they were available.14 By the end
of the Sengoku Period, these issues would largely
be solved and the lowly ashigaru would change the
face of Japanese society, not only by virtue of their
numbers but of the increasing role of technology in
warfare.
The increases, improvements, and
innovations made in Japanese warfare technology
during the Sengoku Period were to have their most
profound effect on the infantry. Up until this time
weapons, armor, and technological advances
associated with war had been reserved exclusively
for the upper class and mounted samurai who were
doing the majority of the fighting. With infantry
rapidly becoming a major factor at the beginning of
the sixteenth century, it was only logical that those
14

Stephen Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 84-85.
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advances, and newer ones spurred on by the near
constant fighting, would be applied to them
eventually. These technological advances would
have the effect of not only making infantry more
and more of a force to be reckoned with on the
battlefield, but also of instilling a sense of discipline
and uniformity among the ―ashigaru‖.
Perhaps the best example for the creation of
uniformity and effectiveness among the ranks of
ashigaru is the evolution of their armor. The first
ashigaru simply brought whatever armor he owned,
often none, to the battlefield, and looted what more
he could take after the battle.15 As the century wore
on and more and more daimyo recognized the
impact their infantry were having on the battlefield,
they began to issue them what is known as okashi
15

Ibid., 85-86.
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gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which consisted chiefly of a
breastplate (dô) and a short armored skirt
(kusazuri).16 This armor was fairly cheap and easy
to make thanks largely to changes brought on by
heavy campaigning, namely the simplification of
the lacing that held individual strips of armor
together. Typical Japanese armor of the time, such
as the dô, were made from overlapping strips of
iron, laced tightly together, that would provide
surprisingly great freedom of movement. As
demand became higher and campaigns lasted
longer, the lacing was loosened and more
strategically placed, making it both cheaper and
easier to tolerate on the march.17 It was the ashigaru
who benefited most from these changes, as daimyo

16

Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 40-41.
17
Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 126.
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were more willing and able to provide volunteers
with suits of the reliable okashi gusoku.
While this minute example shows that the
daimyo were slowly beginning to care enough about
ashigaru to supply them, for good reason as will be
discussed later, it also meant that the daimyo
themselves had more control over the army and the
individual infantrymen. Armor issued by daimyo
was uniform in make and color and often had the
mon, or personal heraldry of the daimyo, painted
somewhere on it.18 Some leaders even went to the
extreme of having their entire force‘s armor and
weapons being a uniform color, such as Il
Naomasa‘s ―Red Devils,‖ who were clad entirely in
shades of red.19 While instances of this extreme are
uncommon, the uniformity of the issued armor
18
19

Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 86.
Turnbull, The Samurai Sourcebook , 44.
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worked to unify and identify the army on the
battlefield. Armor played a key role in helping to
change the ashigaru from a scarcely armed rabble
to a uniform and identifiable fighting force, helping
to bring it together under the control of the daimyo.
The weapons of the ashigaru played a very
similar, but much more visible, role in establishing
discipline and making them a deadly force on the
battlefield. Often simple technological innovations
and regulations in weaponry had a massive
battlefield and social impact. For example, the yumi,
or the Japanese bow. Originally a weapon of the
elite samurai, horse archers par excellence even into
the Sengoku Period, the bow gradually found its
way into the hands the infantry for a variety of
reasons. Bitter military defeats in the Mongol
invasions had taught the Japanese the power of

21

massed bow-fire, where many hundreds of arrows
launched were more effective than single, well
aimed ones.20 This factor had been taken into
account before the Age of Warring States and the
first mention of ashigaru in Japanese history comes
out of the battles during the Nanbokuchō Wars in
the 14th century, where hundreds of shashu no
ashigaru, ―infantry shooters,‖ were employed.21
With the infantry becoming more numerous on the
battlefields of the Sengoku Period, it was only a
small step in logic to arm them with bows to
achieve powerful massed volleys.
It was these volleys that the yumi excelled at
delivering. Though it was initially a weapon of the
samurai, the bow was fairly easy to make and

20

Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖ 78.
21
Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 84.
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powerful, consisting of a strip of hardwood between
two strips of bamboo, held together and treated with
glue and a close binding.22 This layered
construction made them individually powerful
weapons, comparable to European longbows, and
were augmented by a staggering variety of arrows
made for any situation, from cutting armor to
emitting a shrill whistling noise used for signaling
and intimidation.23 Additionally, bows helped instill
discipline in the ashigaru due to the amount of skill
required to be an archer. Ashigaru chosen or
volunteering to be archers would necessarily
undergo periods of training, or help train other
ashigaru, which would give them a previously
unheard of amount of professionalism, a trend that

22

Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 50.
23
Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 22.
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continued in the use of the arquebus. Putting bows
in the hands of the ashigaru also had the profound
effect of breaking down varying social boundaries.
After all, the bow had traditionally been the
exclusive province of the mounted samurai and
giving a weapon with such distinguished
connotations to the lower class is one prime
example as to how the battlefield was changing the
way the Japanese viewed their society.
Another important weapon in the
development of the ashigaru was the spear.
Consistently overlooked, not only in Japanese
military history, in favor gunpowder weapons and
flashier developments, the simple nagae yari had an
equally large impact on the use of infantry. For one,
it was cheaper and easier to use than almost any
other weapon, ideal for quickly arming large bodies

24

of men. And, above every other weapon, the spear
favors larger numbers of troops with little training,
as the basic use of the weapon is abundantly clear:
stick the sharp end into the enemy. As a result, most
Sengoku Period armies had a large percentage of
spearmen in their ranks, often as high as 70%.24
Armies of the Hōjō clan, who controlled the
powerful Kantō region, had spearmen regularly
make up 50% of their armies and Oda Nobunaga,
the first great unifier, led forces that comprised of at
least 27%.25
These two factors made spears integral to
the success not only of ashigaru, but to the daimyo
who led them. While in its basic conception the
spear is an easy weapon to use, spears favor their

24

Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 42.
25
Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103.
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wielders working in close formation and the
introduction of drill and discipline to the ranks of
spearmen in this regard would increase their
battlefield effectiveness many times over. The
Zōhyō Monogatari, a guide to infantry tactics
penned in 1649 by prominent samurai Matsudaira
Nobuoki, says of the ashigaru spearmen:
Unlike samurai spearmen, where
spears are thought of as only for
single combat, here many are of one
mind, with spear points moving
together, keeping a rhythm. When
one or two meet it is find to fight
individually, but when spears are
used en masse there must be
coordination and timing, with no
exception.26

26

―Zōhyō Monogatari,” in Turnbull, The Samurai
Sourcebook , 184. Note that the year, 1649, is almost half a
century after the end of Sengoku Jidai. The author is in a
unique position of observing the final outcome of Sengoku
Period ashigaru tactics and integration, yet the only real
firsthand experience he may have had would be helping put
down the Shimabara Rebellion a decade prior in 1638.

26

The fact that such a section was written
about spear drill and tactics after the Sengoku
Period speaks well to their developing effectiveness
during it. It should come as no surprise to find that
the first daimyo to introduce truly disciplined spear
units was Oda Nobunaga, who relied greatly on
them in most of his engagements and especially at
Nagashino, a battle more known for his use of the
arquebus.27 He made his spears uniformly longer
than any of his opponents (5.6 meters), a detail that,
when combined with his spearmen‘s superior
discipline, made his cheaply outfitted ashigaru a
true menace on the battlefield. This success set the
precedent for spear length becoming a major factor,
so much so that when the daimyo Hōjō Ujimasa
mustered hastily to defend his domain from
27

Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103.
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Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Nobunaga‘s successor, he
would decree ―a spear…is useless if it is shorter
than two ken (twelve feet).‖28
Yet the weapon to produce the most visible
and sweeping changes to infantry warfare was to be
the arquebus, an early handgun introduced by the
Portuguese during the Sengoku Period. Unlike the
bow and spear the arquebus had a host of initial
problems to contend with; the ammunition and
black powder it used could not yet be easily mass
produced and it had a cripplingly short range and
slow rate of fire compared to its yumi counterpart.29
However, the tremendous power of the arquebus,

28

―Compulsory Military Service Decreed by Hōjō
Ujimasa, 1587,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 186.
29
An experienced gunner could load, prime and fire
in about 15 seconds. However, most ashigaru would not be
experienced gunners and averaged around two to three shots a
minute. Turnbull, The Samurai Sourcebook, 137-138.
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commonly called a matchlock because of its system
of firing, outweighed these disadvantages. It fired
an 8mm caliber bullet, which could easily punch
through even the best made suit of armor, instantly
killing or maiming the wearer who would normally
be almost immune to bow fire.30 Such weakness
could also be mitigated by mixing bowmen into the
arquebus formations. Most often appearing in a
ratio of five archers to ten gunners, bowmen could
shoot faster than their cumbersomely armed
companions and thus maintain, to a reasonable
degree, the rate of fire of the handgun formation
while the arqubuses were bring reloaded. This
combination had become so effective and such
standard practice by the end of the Sengoku Period
that this integration was recommended in the Zōhyō
30

Ibid., 137.

29

Monogatari, the previously mentioned guide to
using ashigaru.31 Given the power of the
matchlock, the means available to limit its
weaknesses, and its sheer efficacy, it is no surprise
that a general writing back to his province
requesting reinforcements during Hideyoshi‘s
invasion of Korea asked to ―have them bring as
many guns as possible, for no other equipment is
needed. Give strict orders that all men, even
samurai, carry guns.‖32
The arquebus had one key feature above its
ability to turn men quickly into soldiers through
ease of use and constant drill, in that it was usable
almost exclusively by infantry. With its lengthy
loading procedure, awkward size, and tremendous

31

Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 129.
Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on Japanese
Warfare, 1543-98,‖ 241.
32

30

recoil, the matchlock was not a weapon for the
mounted soldier. Thus, in order to take full
advantage of the potential of these weapons, as
many daimyo attempted to do, they had to rely on
infantry as their handgun arm. Given the large
proportion of infantry already in daimyo armies,
finding these men posed no significant problem, so
it was to the ashigaru that the matchlock conferred
its powerful battlefield advantages. It was
universally easier to use than a bow, which required
much practice and a large amount of natural skill to
fire accurately. Loading and firing a matchlock
could be taught in a day and steady drill could turn
men into professionals in the course of one
campaign season. Better yet, there was almost no
―skill,‖ per se, involved; the procedure was simply a
series of steps to push shot down the barrel, fill the

31

pan with powder, and light the match to fire it,
presumably in the direction of the enemy. The need
for this constant drill also provided an easy means
to turn a rabble of unskilled men into a standing
army, working in tandem with the okashi gusoku
loan armor to instill in the previously footloose men
a sense of unit pride and an incentive to stay.
Despite its disadvantage of being expensive
and more difficult to produce, the arquebus began to
be fielded in increasing numbers, adding to their
effectiveness and slowly transforming Sengoku
Period fighting. Battles began to become large scale
maneuvers of infantry units rather than mad dashes
into the enemy line for a chance at glory. The nature
of the handgun and its battlefield use, concentrated
volleys using multiple lines of gunners to try and
keep up a steady fire, led the way in the concept and

32

eventual creation of units of infantry, and even
cavalry.33 Soldiers would be grouped in large
formations depending on which sort of weapon they
held - bow, spear or arquebus - and used on the
battlefield in groups to try and gain a tactical
advantage. Perhaps no battle demonstrates this
tactic better than the one that propelled Oda
Nobunaga, the first of the great unifiers, to national
prominence: Nagashino.
The Battle of Nagashino itself is mostly
represented in history books, films, and art prints as
the slaughter of masses of samurai cavalry by the
humble but powerful arquebus. While the arquebus
certainly had a major role to play in the battle,
examination of the details reveal that it is more Oda
Nobunaga‘s consummate use of combined arms and
33

Ibid., 244-245.
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dependence on infantry that won the day.
Nagashino was at once both a battle and a siege,
fought in 1575 outside the fortress of Nagashino
which the invading army of Takeda Katsuyori was
attempting to wrestle from the neighboring
Tokugawa control. Katsuyori was the son and heir
to the more famous Takeda Shingen, who was a
well known and much feared commander of
cavalry, of which he possessed a large amount,
especially during the infantry-conscious Sengoku
Jidai. He would pass both his skills as a leader and
his imperial ambitions onto his son, who, during the
Nagashino campaign, attempted to fulfill his
father‘s dream of capturing Kyoto. To do so he had
to go through the territories of Tokugawa Ieyasu,
the later shogun, and Oda Nobunaga, with whom he
had established a firm and mutually beneficial

34

alliance in the recent years. When Nagashino, a key
fortress in the Tokugawa interior, came under siege,
a desperate series of actions brought both the main
army of Ieyasu and a large relief force from
Nobunaga.34
The battle was set up along a series of
marshy and rolling ridges just out of sight of the
fortress of Nagashino, which was then under attack.
Katsuyori, upon hearing of the relief forces heading
towards the castle, decided to meet them in open
battle in order to use his cavalry, superior in both
training and numbers, most effectively. Nobunaga,
whose army made up the bulk of the relief force,
anticipated this move and drew up his army,
predominately infantry, accordingly.35 He knew the

34

Stephen Turnbull, Nagashino 1575 (Oxford:
Osprey History, 2000), 7-12.
35
Ibid., 48-64.
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strength of handguns, having fought against them in
the hands of Buddhist monks and local alliances
known as ikki, and he planned to use these weapons
to their full potential.36
To help guard against Katsuyori‘s fearsome
cavalry, he created a running line of palisades
behind which he placed his and Ieyasu‘s 3,000
gunners. Each palisade intentionally fronted rough
terrain and was broken periodically every few
hundred feet, creating natural points of attack for
Katsuyori and an easy corridor of counterattack for
himself. As another precaution, and a sign of just
how much value he put on the arquebus troops, he
had his personal bodyguard, the most elite samurai
in the army, dismount and take control of the
separate matchlock units. This move not only
36

Ibid., 19 and Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on
Japanese Warfare, 1543-98,‖ 238.

36

strengthened the line, but gave the ashigaru an
enormous shot of discipline, making sure they
would keep courageous and steady. Behind this odd
mix of troops he held his spearmen and many
dismounted samurai to support or counter any
significant breakthrough Katsuyori might achieve.37
With these preparations made, he awaited the
Takeda onslaught.
At six o‘clock on the morning of June 28th,
Katsuyori dutifully gave the order to charge against
Nobunaga‘s line. The action was not as idiotic as it
sounds. The Takeda had four samurai to every three
of Nobunaga‘s gunners and though he was well
aware of the power of the handgun, having seen his
father use them in numerous siege operations, he
was counting on a rainstorm the night before to
37

Turnbull, Nagashino 1575, 48-64.

37

have rendered the powder and matches used for
firing them useless. Even if they had not been
turned into metal-augmented firewood by the
downpour, they would only be able to get off one
shot before his faster and more skilled mounted
samurai were on top of them. So that morning,
4,500 horsemen charged into the teeth of
Nobunaga‘s arquebuses.38
This charge was exactly what Nobunaga had
been expecting and, to a degree, hoping for. In
preparation, he had lined his gunners three ranks
deep, so once the first rank had discharged their
weapon, the second could step forwards and do so,
then step back and let the third do the same. By the
time the third rank had pulled the trigger, the first
rank would ideally have reloaded and would be
38

Ibid., 65-66.
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ready to fire again. Nobunga had used this trick
before, with success, but had never implemented it
on such a scale. As it stood the tactic had the
desired effect, the ashigaru having kept their
powder and matches dry, and all Katsuyori could do
was watch in horror as three volleys in a previously
unbelievable succession tore his samurai apart. As
the morning progressed, however, the Takeda
managed to get to grips with Nobunaga‘s army,
especially once Katsuyori committed his infantry
and reserves, including his own personal guard.
Nobunaga‘s right flank in particular, which was not
protected by the palisade or any form of fence,
became the scene of close and bloody hand-to-hand
combat.39

39

Ibid., 68-78.
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Hours later, Nobunaga gave the signal to fall
back to a second line of fences prepared at the same
time as the main palisades. Once disengaged,
Katsuyori began to move his army back to regroup
and possibly consider retreating. Nobunaga did not
give him a chance. Once it was clear the Takeda
were falling back, he had his samurai mount and
give pursuit, wreaking havoc on Katsuyori‘s
disorganized army. While Katsuyori and most of his
high command escaped, it became obvious by
nightfall that Nobunaga had carried the day. The
Takeda withdrew back into their home province.40
In light of such a brief description, it is easy
to see the temptation of writing Nagashino off as
being won solely by the use of firearms. As
mentioned before, an examination of the details
40
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reveals Nobunaga‘s genius in the use of combined
arms tactics and his recognition of the power of
infantry. If Nagashino had truly been a battle won
by firepower mowing down cavalry, it would not
have had several of the key features it did, such as
its grueling length, over eight hours, or any
prearranged fall back action by Nobunaga. Notably,
much of the decisive damage from a strategic
standpoint was done not by the gunners in the
opening hours, but by the mounted samurai and the
light-footed ashigaru during the twilight as they
systematically destroyed the Takeda rearguard and
large formations of panicked troops.41
If it was not the use of firearms that decided
the battle, then it was unquestionably Nobunaga‘s
previously stated genius at combined arms and
41

Ibid., 72.

41

dependence on infantry. Nobunaga was wise
enough to take into consideration most, if not all, of
the factors previously discussed in relation to
weaponry and dominance of infantry. He made sure
that his men were armed correctly and superiorly,
and also made sure there were more of them than
the enemy. Nobunaga‘s force on its own,
disregarding his Tokugawa allies, numbered 30,000
men, twice that of Katsuyori‘s army.42
Tactically, he took full advantage of the
infantry‘s capabilities and newfound flexibility.
Homogenization of units by weapon types allowed
him to deploy a strong front of purely arquebus
troops, supported by units more suited for close
combat, such as his well disciplined, effective, and
numerous ashigaru spearmen. Indeed, it was in
42
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these spearmen where a large portion of his
advantage lay. Accepting the fact that the Takeda
cavalry would probably reach his lines despite his
innovative use of handguns, he set up his line of
battle to give him an advantage wherever they broke
through. By creating gaps in a staggered line of
palisades, he effectively directed the focal point of
the Takeda charge, right into the waiting spear ends
of his ashigaru.
The flexibility and ease of control
specialization offered also allowed him to pull back,
replace, and redeploy units quickly, a characteristic
that proved invaluable when the samurai did
manage to force a hole in the line. Enemy cavalry
under Obata Masamori did at one point manage to
breach the line of palisades during a lull in the
firing, only to be bloodily repulsed as the gunners
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fell back to make room for the spearmen and
dismounted samurai to come up.43 Numerous other
breakthroughs were also repelled by the ability of
Nobunaga to set up a flank assault on the breaching
forces, thanks to the deadly combination of
ashigaru discipline, unit continuity, and the
staggered line of palisades. At the end of the day,
this flexibility also proved decisive as Nobunaga
was able to react almost instantly to the retreating
Takeda army, the disciplined and homogonous
makeup of the units allowing him to keep them
together and, in some instances, turn them on the
spot to pursue the enemy. He also successfully
employed his mounted samurai at this point,
unleashing speed, martial prowess, and hunger for
glory at just the right moment to make an impact.
43
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Nagashino is an excellent example of how
Nobunga‘s military power and political dominance
was derived from the infantry. With this newfound
emphasis on the ashigaru, the samurai suddenly
found themselves in a clumsy situation, one that
they would need to adapt to in order to survive.
Their inferiors were beginning to take over their
previous role, that of the protector and warrior of
Japan, and their superiors, their daimyo lords, were
beginning to strengthen their control over the
battlefield. The samurai, while the elite, were no
longer the sole arbiters on the field of battle. The
technological edge, discipline, and sheer numbers of
the ashigaru combined to reduce the mounted
samurai from the dominant military force to a mere
officer class over the course of the Sengoku Period,
diluting their claims to prestige and allowing the
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daimyo to control and benefit from war. The
samurai were forced into their new role by both
sides of the social scale, each side deriving its
power directly from the newfound dominance of the
infantry. From the bottom, smaller local samurai
would be able to gain power and retainers, unit
commanders, and even ashigaru would be able to
ascend the social ladder, redefining the role of the
samurai class as a whole. From the top, the need for
centralized control to use the power of the infantry
would give the daimyo unprecedented control over
the samurai, allowing these local lords, rather than
the warrior ideal of Japan, to take the proverbial
reins of Japan‘s future.
Samurai, especially during Sengoku, was by
no means a definite term. While it is typically, and
ideally, used to describe Japan‘s mounted archer
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elite who were responsible for defending the island
and winning personal glory on the battlefield, it
could describe any man from those who met this
ideal down to a simple village headmen, whose only
similarity to their heroic brethren was that they
served the same lord and could be called on for
military service. These lower samurai, called
village samurai or ji-samurai, would find
themselves in positions of unexpected power and
influence during the Sengoku Period.44 As de facto
leaders in their community due to their status and
comparative wealth, they became an important link
from the daimyo to the village, where most of the
recruits for infantry service were drawn from. In
return for their services mustering and organizing
44
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recruits the ji-samurai were in an ideal position not
only to lead on the battlefield, but to demand
privilege from their superiors in return for their
services.45
Thus, many of these lower samurai rose
rapidly in military rank and wealth, expanding the
ideas and sensibilities of the samurai class as a
whole. Not only did they very visibly lack horses,
an essential ingredient for the ideal samurai, but
they could be employed as unit leaders, whose role
was not to charge onto the field in search of glory,
but to stay with their men to coordinate them with
other units on the battlefield, interpret orders from
the daimyo, and ensure that they were kept under
control. Privilege and ascension in the samurai class
did not have to take the form of battlefield glory, or
45
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even anything to do with war. Often times the
rewards of the ji-samurai would be land, money, or
simply more duties to attend to. There was also the
distinct possibility of being promoted to a daimyo‘s
household or personal staff and retainers, great
honors not necessarily involving military duty. This
mobility started to distort the image of what a
samurai truly was, by having increasing numbers of
rising samurai occupying administrative or practical
jobs not necessarily on the battlefield or in pursuit
of personal honor. All these factors began to
change, from the bottom up, the way the samurai
functioned on the battlefield and, as a social group,
gave a new meaning to what it meant to be a
samurai.
In addition, promotion to the samurai rank
was not unheard of. Skilled or brave unit leaders,
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especially those of higher rank such as ashigaru
kashira (captain of ashigaru), had the very real
means to be promoted to samurai. This new status
was often designated by taking a surname and the
number of surnamed ashigaru kashira and ashigaru
ko gashira on many, particularly late, Sengoku
Period muster rolls and casualty lists indicates that
this practice, while perhaps exceptional, was far
from rare.46 These newer samurai would have much
the same effect as the ji-samurai on the definition of
the samurai class as a whole. With different
responsibilities, skills, and levels of wealth, the
newly promoted samurai would change the very
definition of the word. Samurai were no longer the
heroic ideal, charging out to meet the foe in
personal combat, relying on the bow and spear.
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They were now to be an officer class, a social rather
than warrior elite who helped the daimyo campaign
and command in battle, not win it on the strength of
their own arms. Nobunaga displayed at least a
temporary awareness of this fact at Nagashino,
notably when he appointed members of his own
bodyguard to command the arquebus gunners on the
front line. These samurai were, most likely to their
frustration, denied the opportunity to gain personal
glory or charge into the enemy, but in turn ruled the
ashigaru with an iron fist, keeping them disciplined,
steady and most importantly, close together, making
it easier to withstand the Takeda cavalry charge.
If the role of the samurai was being
squeezed and adapted from below by those rising
through the ranks, then it was also being redefined
from above, in some instances with no pretext of
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subtlety. This change came from the daimyo, the
lords whom the samurai served and were ostensibly
loyal to, and who were now making the most of the
Sengoku Period turmoil to improve their position.
Technically, they were samurai in and of
themselves as the shogunate was a military regime
and thus its officials were all of military rank, and
their official title of shugo-daimyo reflected this.
Historically, they exercised very little actual control
over battlefield events and acted more as a military
governor of their province, seeing that civil affairs
were carried out while the samurai warriors sought
renown on the battlefield.47 This idea began to
change with the onset of Sengoku Jidai, as daimyo
began to have a more invested interest in battlefield
happenings as the course of one battle could see
47
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them forced out of office, overthrown by retainers,
or suddenly propelled into prominence. Daimyo
thus began to exercise more control over individual
battles and the samurai below them though several
different means, almost all of which have their roots
in the predominance of the ashigaru.
Battles between samurai armies have often
been compared to battles in medieval Europe, where
the paradigm of a knight and his retainers on the
battlefield reigned supreme. Perhaps a more fitting
comparison is between the samurai and the
Homeric heroes of the Trojan War. Combat for
samurai was much more of a ritualized, individual
affair than a knightly charge, and the retainers and
rabble of infantry would, at the onset of a battle,
demurely keep back and let the two individual
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heroes fight it out for supremacy.48 This kind of
ritualized single combat is devoid of central control,
or indeed any real scheme for winning the battle,
making it difficult for a daimyo, with his renewed
interest in the fighting, to exert influence. The shift
of battlefield dominance to the infantry changed
this. As noted before, infantry armies were large
and worked best when segregated based on
weaponry, in effect creating different ―branches‖ of
the army and different units within those branches,
all of which needed some sort of central
coordination to work effectively. Samurai, with
their individualized combat routines and emphasis
on personal heroism, were in no position to take that
role. The daimyo, already nominally the head of
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state and the one man of power presumably more
interested in winning effectively than being first
into battle, was in an ideal position to assume the
mantle of command. The infantry, in effect, created
a need for centralized command and control, one
that allowed the daimyo, or anyone who felt like
seizing the title, to benefit greatly.
Once this basic relationship was established,
the daimyo could take steps to not only increase
their power, but also to rein in the samurai both
politically and militarily. With the coming of larger
and larger armies, one method of control adopted by
the daimyo was that of battlefield formations. While
they continued to evolve throughout the Sengoku
Period, the formations were almost universally
based on old Chinese concepts, with modification
for some distinctly Japanese features, such as the
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large body of arquebus troops.49 Two things are
exceptional about the battle formations: the
integration of infantry and the way in which they
facilitated centralized coordination. The first is
notable because battle formations were rarely
cavalry-centric and made good use of the
specialization, a feature almost exclusive to
infantry, to work and win the day. For example, the
koyaku (yoke) formation puts up a strong frontage
of gunners and archers supported by spearmen, with
a large force of dismounted samurai in an arrow
shaped reserve.50 The placement and overlap of
these units allowed them to provide mutual support,
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something only possible with the advent of the
specialized infantry unit.
The way in which they facilitated
centralized coordination is most important when the
daimyo‘s ability to control the battlefield is taken
into account. Not only did having every man in a set
place make setting up and executing predefined
maneuvers infinitely easier, but the amount of drill
and discipline that goes into being able to make
such formations work helps to turn the previously
footloose ashigaru into a loyal fighting force.51 It
also allowed for a good deal of battlefield control
over the samurai, who have been organized into
specialized units and made to follow orders, even if
it goes against their ideals. In the case of the koyaku
especially, the samurai are held in reserve and not
51
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in front of the formation, the place where any selfrespecting and competitive samurai hero should be!
This centralized power the infantry gave to
the daimyo also began to manifest itself in the
socio-political areas of Japanese life. Daimyo began
to exercise stricter control in the form of ―house
codes‖ and ―house precepts‖ aimed at governing
their domains, populace, and especially samurai.
Many of the articles in the codes are aimed
particularly at demolishing samurai battlefield
independence and putting them in a subordinate and
contained role. For example, Article 26 of the Yūki
House Code:
Article 26: Wherever it may be to, you must
not gallop forth as a lone rider without
receiving orders from the Yūki. But when
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summoned by the Yūki, you must not be
tardy.52
Or, even more strongly worded, Articles 67 and 72:
Article 67: To gallop forth
heedlessly and without thought
because you hear the sound of the
conch shell from the main fort that
signals taking to the field is quite
unpardonable. If the shell sounds,
you should go to a village and
quickly dispatch some underling or
servant to the main fort and have him
inquire into where you should go.
Only then should you gallop forth…
Article 72: Men of the horse units
should obviously not join an outside
group, nor should they join a
different group within the Yūki
house…The horse units should
always act in conjunction with ten or
twenty other riders and not mingle
with other groups.53
The daimyo here mean to rein in as best they
can the battle-eager samurai. Notice especially the
discouragement of riding out alone and the
52
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emphasis on staying within a unit. Both these
concepts helped the daimyo to exercise more
control over their subjects, who had previously been
dominant in the arts and strategy of war and may
not take kindly to being simply ordered into
formation. Using the ideas of honor that underlay
almost all codes created by feudal lords and the
samurai‘s strong virtue and ideal of loyalty, the
daimyo began to fundamentally change the
definition of the samurai class from above, even as
they sought greater control and power for
themselves. Just as they elevated ji-samurai and
unit commanders to dilute the image of the warrior
class, so to they also compressed them into elite
fighting units or put them in commands subordinate
to themselves on the battlefield. Being a samurai
during Sengoku Japan slowly began to mean being
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a member of the officer caste, one who was above
the foot soldiers and other members of the same
class, but who was ultimately subordinate to the
daimyo and certainly not in charge of his own
individual actions or glory on the battlefield.
It is worth reiterating that this power exerted
by the daimyo over the samurai was made possible
by the need for centralized control created by the
numbers, specialization, and increasing
professionalism of the infantry. The most prominent
and powerful daimyo did not construct their power
around a large base of mounted samurai supporters;
they instead made sure that their infantry were well
supplied, numerous, and under their direct control.
Oda Nobunaga, a man of previously recognized
military capacity, invested his money at the outset
of the military campaign season of 1549 not in
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samurai katana and horses, but in 500 matchlock
guns with which to equip his infantry.54 House
codes, in addition to keeping a tight hold on the
samurai, supported the arming of multiple
infantrymen over a single samurai, such as in the
famous article from Asakura Toshikage:
4. Do not excessively covet swords
made by famous masters. Even if
you own a sword or dagger worth
10,000 pieces, it can be overcome by
100 spears each worth 100 pieces.
Therefore, use the 10,000 pieces to
procure 100 spears, and arm 100
men with them. You can in this
manner defend yourself in time of
war.55
While this code was written early in the
Sengoku Period, it demonstrates that at least some
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daimyo grasped the importance of the ashigaru over
mounted samurai in maintaining their power. Once
the correlation between the infantryman and the
newfound military influence of the daimyo was
fully comprehended, they understandably took
measures to secure and solidify it. One previously
discussed method was through armor, the okashi
gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which they could use to
standardize the quality and appearance of their
army. Another notable way of doing so, that also
conveniently undermined traditional samurai
power, was of direct recruitment of ashigaru from
the villages. Traditionally, samurai had been
required to bring men from the area which they
ruled, who were then loosely organized and
employed. By going straight to the source, so to
speak, the daimyo cut the samurai middleman out
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of the picture and increased his own influence over
the infantry units.56 This practice also had the sideeffect of increasing the importance of the ji-samurai
as mentioned earlier who, as a result of interest in
recruitment from their villages, had more contact
and political clout with their daimyo lords.
The man who perhaps best understood this
correlation and took the most dramatic steps to
protect it was Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second great
unifier of Japan himself. Having come to power
after the death of Nobunaga, he proceeded during
the later decades of the 16th century to unify all of
Japan under his control through a series of military
and social maneuvers that rivaled Nobunaga‘s in
mastery. Even before he had conquered the entire
island, he refined and created an efficient standing
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army, which depended almost solely on him for its
supplies, arms, and equipment. He managed this
task by setting up centralized government storage
systems and military contracts, which made
virtually all those under his command rely on his
will in order to conduct military operations.57
His masterstrokes in securing power came,
however, in 1588 and 1591, when he issued two
separate, but mutually supportive, edicts that
changed the structure of Japan for well over two
and half centuries. 1588 saw the implementation of
the infamous ―Sword Hunt‖ Edict, which made it
forbidden for farmers ―to have in their possession
any swords, short swords, bows, spears, firearms, or
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other types of weapons.‖58 The weapons collected
from this mass confiscation ostensibly went to the
creation of a gigantic statue of Buddha, but most
probably went into state armories to prepare for the
invasion of Korea launched in 1592.59 In one stroke,
Hideyoshi had essentially created a military class in
Japan. By disarming the farmers and commoners,
the only weapons left in the state were those
wielded by the soldiers in the standing armies,
which included previously recruited ashigaru. In
1591, the class realities that had developed because
of the Sword Hunt were solidified in law when
Hideyoshi issued the Separation Edict, which
decreed that any man attempting to leave his social
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class would be ―punished accordingly‖ and his
village or master could be ―regarded as committing
a culpable offense.‖60 By creating punishments for
leaving one‘s station in life, warrior, farmer,
commoner, or merchant, Hideyoshi in effect created
a government enforced class system, one that would
have huge ramifications for the ashigaru and the
samurai.
Since ashigaru were now locked into the
military, they officially formed a lower class of
samurai. Hideyoshi‘s edict had simply legalized
and solidified the system that had already been
developed: the assimilation of the ashigaru and, to a
degree, daimyo into the samurai class and the
accompanying redefinition. The term ―samurai‖
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now referred essentially to any fighting man rather
than the heroic ideal. What had developed
throughout the Sengoku Period was essentially a
larger warrior class with very real social mobility;
ashigaru could become unit leaders, unit leaders
could become samurai, and samurai could become
anything from the lord of a local province to a
daimyo. Having risen from the ranks himself,
though never having quite attained the samurai
class, Hideyoshi must have been fully aware of the
system that was developing and simply took the
dramatic step to implement it on a legal and
national level in order to protect his own power. He
would have little to worry about from upstart
samurai now that they had officially become an
officer class and only had the power to move up or
down in the system, rather than out through
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demonstrations of personal prowess on the
battlefield. Hideyoshi‘s rise and the power system
he left in place for the Tokugawa shoguns was
engendered and supported by the rising star of the
ashigaru footman. It simply took a leader, or
multiple leaders, who knew how to use them and
who recognized their power to truly change the face
of Japan.
St. Francis Xavier‘s simplistic observation
of them in 1550 was perhaps truer than any concept
the Japanese had of their own warriors at the time:
―They are excellent archers and fight on foot,
although there are horses in the country.‖61 As a
foreigner observing the warfare of Sengoku Jidai,
he picked up on two things quickly: the martial skill
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of the Japanese and the prevalence of the ashigaru.
The use of horses is casually dismissed, something
it would take a great man of Japan another twenty
five years to even consider doing. Yet such a simple
observation cuts to the heart of it. It was the
infantryman, the lowly light-foot, who had the
power to change Japan. Geography and technology
conspired to put it into his hands and allowed able
leaders such as Oda Nobunaga to win decisive
victories with ingenious tactics. That same power
was lent to Toyotomi Hideyoshi who would bring to
a head all the change that had been over a century in
the making and would redefined not only what it
meant to be a samurai, but what it meant to be a
warrior in medieval Japan. As Asakura Sōteki wrote
in his house precepts ―call the warrior a dog, call
him a beast: winning is his business,‖ an attitude
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that would shape Japan and give the ashigaru the
necessary influence to do so.62

62

―House Precepts in the Sengoku Age,‖ in Sources
of Japanese Tradition, ed. Wm. Theodore De Bary, 2nd ed.,
vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 428.

71

